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Security Strategies and Equilibria in Multiobjective Ma-
trix Games
Abstract: Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed
from two different points of view: equilibrium concepts and security strate-
gies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilib-
rium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix
games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security
strategies, named security equilibria.
Key words: multiobjective matrix games, multicriteria games, security strate-
gies, security equilibria, border strategies, Pareto equilibria.
Resum: Los juegos matriciales multiobjetivo han sido abordados en la liter-
atura bajo dos enfoques diferenciados: busqueda de estrategias de seguridad
y ana´lisis de los pares de estrategias de equilibrio. En este trabajo se explora
la idea de que, como ocurre en los juegos matriciales de un u´nico objetivo,
ambos jugadores intentan alcanzar pares de estrategias de equilibrio jugando
sus estrategias de seguridad. Se exponen las condiciones que garantizan la
existencia de estos equilibrios cuando ambos jugadores juegan estrategias de
de seguridad. A estos equilibrios se les llamara equilibrios de seguridad.
1 Introduction
The well-known classical zero-sum games, or matrix games, have a natural
extension if we consider vector payoffs, that is, multiple goals for both play-
ers. This kind of games has attracted limited attention in the game theory
literature, but nevertheless it is possible to describe two lines of study. One
of them is based upon the concept of equilibrium points; the other one uses
the notion of Pareto optimality or efficiency.
In the line of identifying equilibrium points, Shapley [5] defines the con-
cept of equilibrium in matrix games with vector payoffs and proves that the
solution of a certain scalarized nonzero-sum game gives some of the equilibria
of the original multiobjective game. Borm et al. [1] show that the Pareto
equilibrium points of a nonzero-sum multiobjective game correspond to Nash
equilibria of single-objective games derived from strictly positive weighted ob-
jective functions, and conversely. In addition to that, Borm et al. use a simple
and graphic method to find the equilibrium points in nonzero-sum 2×2 multi-
objective games. In general the set of equilibrium points contains more than
one element.
On the other hand, Ghose and Prassad [4] define the notion of Pareto-
optimal security strategies in multiobjective matrix games. The interpretation
of that concept is that every player chooses his strategy considering the worst
payoff he may incur in each objective separately. The Pareto-optimal security
strategies of a player are characterized in [3], [2] and [6].
In the present paper we study multiobjective matrix games, based upon
the idea that players can reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security
strategies, in a similar way than in a scalar matrix game. We present security
equilibrium concepts and we prove that in all cases there exists at least a pair
of security strategies that simultaneously satisfy weak equilibrium properties.
Finally we give sufficient conditions guaranteeing security equilibria existence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 formulates the multiobjective
matrix game and reviews equilibrium concepts. Section 2 presents the concept
of security strategies and introduces a simple method to find them in 2×2
games. In Section 3 we combine both concepts in order to prove existence of
weak security equilibria. We also analyze the existence of security equilibria
in multiobjective 2×2 matrix games. Some proofs are in the appendix.
2 Some definitions and remarks
A two-person multiobjectivem×n zero-sum game is given by Ω = (Ω1, . . . ,Ωr),
a vector of r payoff matrices, each one with m rows and n columns. The first
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player chooses a row, and the second a column. The payoff for the first player
is the vector of elements selected in each matrix, and the payoff for the second
player is just the opposite. We denote by MOG0(m × n, r) the set of these
games.
The r components of Ω represent the matrix payoffs to player I in each
of the objectives of the game. The elements in the payoff matrices will be
denoted by Ωk = (ωkij), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, where k denotes an
arbitrary objective, k = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Mixed strategy spaces for the players I and II are
X = {x ∈ Rm |
m∑
i=1
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m}
and
Y = {y ∈ Rn |
n∑
j=1
yj = 1, yj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n}.
If there exists i∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that xi∗ = 1 and xi = 0 for all i 6= i
∗, the
strategy x ∈ X is a pure strategy, and it will be represented by sIi∗ . Otherwise,
x is a proper mixed strategy. Similarly we will use sIIj∗ , j
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, for
the pure strategies associated to the second player.
In the mixed extension, when I plays x and II plays y, the payoff for I is
xΩyt = (xΩ1yt, . . . ,xΩryt) ∈ Rr. For pure strategies, if I plays x = sIi and II
plays y = sIIj , the k-objective payoff for I is ω
k
ij, and II obtains −ω
k
ij.
We adopt the following notations. For any two vectors a, b ∈ Rr, a ≥ b
means aj ≥ bj for all j = 1, . . . , r; a > b means a ≥ b and a 6= b; and finally
we write a≫ b if aj > bj for all j = 1, . . . , r.
Let U ⊆ Rr and u ∈ U ; then the vector u is undominated in U if the set
{v ∈ U | v ≥ u} reduces to {u}. The vector u is weakly undominated in U if
{v ∈ U | v ≫ u} is empty.
Given a strategy y∗ ∈ Y , the payoff set for player I is PI(y
∗) = {xΩy∗t |
x ∈ X} ⊆ Rr. Similarly, once fixed a strategy x∗ ∈ X, the payoff set for
player II is PII(x
∗) = {−x∗Ωyt | y ∈ Y } ⊆ Rr.
Strategies producing undominated payoff vectors for I in PI(y
∗) are called
best reply strategies for player I:
BRSI(y
∗) = {x ∈ X | xΩy∗t is undominated in PI(y
∗)}.
Similarly, the set of best reply strategies for player II is:
BRSII(x
∗) = {y ∈ Y | −x∗Ωyt is undominated in PII(x
∗)}.
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Then, a Pareto equilibrium is a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) ∈ X × Y satis-
fying x∗ ∈ BRSI(y
∗) and y∗ ∈ BRSII(x
∗). The set of Pareto equilibria is
denoted by PE(Ω).
Notice that when we have got only one objective, that is to say r = 1, the
Nash equilibrium is a particular case of Pareto equilibrium.
Similarly, a weak Pareto equilibrium is a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) ∈
X × Y such that x∗ ∈ WBRSI(y
∗) and y∗ ∈WBRSII(x
∗), where
WBRSI(y
∗) = {x ∈ X | xΩy∗t is weakly undominated in PI(y
∗)},
WBRSII(x
∗) = {y ∈ Y | −x∗Ωytis weakly undominated in PII(x
∗)}.
The set of weak Pareto equilibria is denoted by WPE(Ω).
Pareto equilibria are studied in [1] in the context of multiobjective bimatrix
games. In [5] the existence of Pareto equilibria and weak Pareto equilibria
for multiobjective matrix games is analyzed. These results, applied to the
framework of the present paper are summarized in Theorem 1 and their proof
can be found in [1] and [5].
Let ∆r be the unit simplex in R
r, and
o
∆r its relative interior,
∆r = {(δ1, . . . , δr) ∈ R
r |
r∑
k=1
δk = 1, δk ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , r},
o
∆r= {(δ1, . . . , δr) ∈ R
r |
r∑
k=1
δk = 1, δk > 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , r}.
Then, any element of ∆r, or
o
∆r, can be interpreted as a weighted system for
the objectives or criteria of the original game. Therefore, given a weighted sys-
tem α for player I and β for player II, we can associate a standard scalarization
of the original multiobjective game as follows:
(Ω(α),Ω(β)) = (
r∑
k=1
αkΩ
k,−
r∑
k=1
βkΩ
k). (1)
Notice that, in general, the bimatrix game given in (1) is not a zero-sum
game.
Theorem 1 Let it be Ω ∈MOG0(m× n, r).
1. Let α and β be a pair of weighting vectors, and let E((Ω(α),Ω(β))) be
the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria of the scalar bimatrix
game (Ω(α),Ω(β)) given by (1). Then:
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1.1 If α, β ∈
o
∆r, then E(Ω(α),Ω(β)) ⊆ PE(Ω),
1.2 If α, β ∈ ∆r, then E(Ω(α),Ω(β)) ⊆ WPE(Ω).
2. Moreover:
2.1 If (x∗,y∗) ∈ PE(Ω), then there exists a pair of vectors α, β ∈
o
∆r,
such that (x∗,y∗) ∈ E(Ω(α),Ω(β)).
2.2 If (x∗,y∗) ∈ WPE(Ω), then there exists a pair of vectors α, β ∈ ∆r,
such that (x∗,y∗) ∈ E(Ω(α),Ω(β)).
Existence of Pareto equilibria and weak Pareto equilibria are easily de-
duced from the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and the above
theorem. Moreover, from Theorem 1
PE(Ω) =
⋃
α,β∈
o
∆r
E(Ω(α),Ω(β)),
WPE(Ω) =
⋃
α,β∈∆r
E(Ω(α),Ω(β)).
As a consequence, in general, PE(Ω) is not a singleton.
3 Security strategies
The concept of Pareto-optimal security strategies is studied, among others, in
[4], [3], [2] and [6]. In this section we work with security strategies, and we
describe a new procedure to determine them in the 2×2 multiobjective matrix
games.
The interpretation behind the concept of security strategies is that every
player acts considering the worst payoff he or she may incur in each objective
separately for a given strategy. The r-tuples we can define with these payoffs
are named security level. Observe that this interpretation is inherent in the
concept of maxmin and minmax payoffs for a scalar game.
We define the functions f : X → Rr for player I and g : Y → Rr for player
II as
f(x) = (f 1(x), f 2(x), . . . , f r(x)) = (min
y∈Y
xΩ1yt, . . . ,min
y∈Y
xΩryt),
g(y) = (g1(y), g2(y), . . . , gr(y)) = (max
x∈X
xΩ1yt, . . . ,max
x∈X
xΩryt).
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Notice that f(x) and g(y) determine the guaranteed payoffs in each of
the objectives to I and II respectively. By continuity and compacity of the
domain, the previous functions are well defined.
Following the definition in [4], we now introduce the set of Pareto-optimal
security strategies for player I and player II, which we name security strate-
gies, as
XS = {x
∗ ∈ X | if x ∈ X is such that f(x∗) ≤ f(x), then f(x∗) = f(x)},
YS = {y
∗ ∈ Y | if y ∈ Y is such that g(y∗) ≥ g(y), then g(y∗) = g(y)}.
Observe that XS and YS are not empty since f(x) and g(y) are continuous
vector functions defined in compact domains.
The strategies in XS and YS guarantee undominated security levels to
player I and II respectively and they are the maximal and the minimal ele-
ments of the ordered sets (f(X),≤) and (g(Y ),≥).
A method to determine security strategies by means of scalarization of the
original multiobjective game can be found in [3]. In [2] the sets of security
strategies are obtained by means of solving multiobjective linear programs.
If we isolate the k objective from the original game Ω ∈MOG0(m× n, r),
the solutions to the optimization problem Maxx∈Xf
k(x) are the equilibrium
strategies for player I in the scalar zero-sum game Ωk. We denote by O(I,Ωk)
the set of these solutions, and similarly we name O(II,Ωk) the set of such
solutions for player II, i.e. Miny∈Y g
k(y).
Observe that, due to the continuity and the concavity of the functions
fk(x), the sets O(I,Ωk) are closed and convex.
In spite of the fact that the sets of security strategies are difficult to obtain
in the generalm×n case, and only some algorithms are known (see for instance
[2] and [6]), we can show some general properties which will be useful later
on.
If the intersection of the optimal sets of one player is non-empty it coincides
with his set of security strategies. Moreover we can see, and this will be crucial
in our analysis, that for the general case m×n at least one optimal strategy of
every set O(I,Ωk) is a security strategy as we prove in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 For any game Ω ∈MOG0(m× n, r) it holds:
1. If ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅, then XS = ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k).
2. For any k = 1, 2, . . . , r we have O(I,Ωk)∩XS 6= ∅ and O(II,Ω
k)∩YS 6=
∅.
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Proof.
For the first statement, if x ∈ ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) then fk(x) ≥ fk(x′), for
any x′ ∈ X and k = 1, 2, . . . , r. Let us suppose that x∗ ∈ X exists such that
f(x) ≤ f(x∗). Then, since x ∈ ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) we have f(x) = f(x∗),
which implies x ∈ XS.
Assume now x ∈ XS. Since ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅, let x∗ ∈ ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k).
We have fk(x) ≤ fk(x∗) for k = 1, 2, . . . , r. Since x ∈ XS we obtain
fk(x) = fk(x∗) for k = 1, 2, . . . , r. So x ∈ ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k).
For the second statement, let us suppose that, for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r},
O(I,Ωk) ∩ XS = ∅. Take α = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈
o
∆r a vector of positive weights
and let x∗ ∈ O(I,Ωk) be a solution of Maxx∈O(I,Ωk)h(x), where h(x) =∑r
i=1 αif
i(x).
Since x∗ ∈ O(I,Ωk), by assumption x∗ /∈ XS, which means that there
exists x′ ∈ X such that f(x∗) ≤ f(x′) and f(x∗) 6= f(x′). There are two
possible cases. If x′ ∈ O(I,Ωk), then h(x∗) < h(x′) getting a contradiction. If
not, x′ /∈ O(I,Ωk), but since x∗ ∈ O(I,Ωk) this means fk(x∗) > fk(x′) which
involves a contradiction with the fact that f(x∗) ≤ f(x′).
As a first consequence of the above proposition, we propose a direct method
to determine the security strategies in the case of 2× 2 games.
For 2× 2 games it is possible to substitute the strategies x and y by their
projections in [0,1]. That is to say, the strategies for I and II in the game
MOG0(2× 2, r) are x = (x, 1− x) and y = (y, 1− y), where x, y ∈ [0, 1].
By means of the last notation it is possible to identify the sets O(I,Ωk) as
intervals [akI , b
k
I ] in [0,1], where a
k
I ≤ b
k
I .
Among the extremes of all the intervals [akI , b
k
I ] we are going to select two
specific strategies which will be necessary to determine the security strategies
set.
Definition 3 The border strategies of player I in the game Ω ∈MOG0(2×
2, r) are the strategies aΩI = maxk∈{1,...,r}a
k
I and b
Ω
I = mink∈{1,...,r}b
k
I .
Similarly, aΩII = maxk∈{1,...,r}a
k
II and b
Ω
II = mink∈{1,...,r}b
k
II are the border
strategies for player II, where O(II,Ωk) = [akII , b
k
II ] for k = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Observe that we only need to calculate the r intervals O(I,Ωk), k =
1, 2, . . . , r, to determine the border strategies. The border strategies will be
precisely the extreme points of the set of security strategies, as we prove in
the next theorem.
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Proposition 4 Let it be Ω ∈MOG0(2× 2, r). The sets of security strategies
for players in Ω are the intervals defined by their border strategies: XS =
[min(aΩI , b
Ω
I ),max(a
Ω
I , b
Ω
I )] and YS = [min(a
Ω
II , b
Ω
II),max(a
Ω
II , b
Ω
II)].
Proof.
See Appendix.
Proposition 4 gives a direct and simple method to determine the security
strategies in any 2×2 multiobjective game independently of the number of
objectives. We review some examples to determine in an easy way the security
strategies.
Example 5 Consider the following game (see [4], example 4.1):
Ω = (Ω1,Ω2) =
[(
0 2
1 0
)
,
(
0 −1
−2 0
)]
.
Solving the scalar games Ω1 and Ω2 we obtain the optimal sets: O(I,Ω1) =
[a1I , b
1
I ] = {1/3} and O(I,Ω
2) = [a2I , b
2
I ] = {2/3}. Therefore, XS = [1/3, 2/3].
Similarly O(II,Ω1) = {2/3}, O(II,Ω2) = {1/3} and then YS = [1/3, 2/3].
Example 6 Consider the game
Ω = (Ω1,Ω2) =
[(
2 0
1 3
)
,
(
0 3
1 2
)]
.
Solving the scalar games Ω1 and Ω2 we obtain the optimal sets: O(I,Ω1) =
[a1I , b
1
I ] = {1/2} and O(I,Ω
2) = [a2I , b
2
I ] = {0}. So, XS = [a
Ω
I , b
Ω
I ] = [0, 1/2].
Similarly O(II,Ω1) = {3/4}, O(II,Ω2) = {1} and then YS = [3/4, 1].
Observe, from Proposition 4, that for the 2×2 case the security strategies
form a convex set in the strategy space. Let us see that this is not the case in
general.
Example 7 Consider now the game:
Ω = (Ω1,Ω2) =



 1 0 00 2 0
0 0 3

 ,

 0 2 33 0 2
2 3 0



 .
For this game O(I,Ω1) = {x1} = {(6/11, 3/11, 2/11)} and O(I,Ω2) =
{x2} = {(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)}. By Proposition 2, x1,x2 ∈ XS. But for example
xc = 3x1/5 + 2x2/5 = (76/165, 49/165, 40/165) is not in XS because it is
dominated by x∗ = (9/19, 7/19, 3/19) since f(xc) = (0.46, 1.375) < f(x∗) =
(0.47, 1.42). Then XS is not a convex set.
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Finally, as a direct consequence, we characterize the situation when one
player has a unique security strategy.
Corollary 8 For any game Ω ∈ MOG0(m × n, r) the following statements
are equivalent,
1. XS = {x
∗},
2. ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) = {x∗}.
Proof.
Apply Proposition 2.
The condition ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) = {x∗} tells us that the first player has a
unique common equilibrium in all the scalar games Ωk. The above corollary
shows that this strategy x∗ will also be a security strategy for this player.
We could see these cases as pathological, since once player I is constrained to
play strategy x∗, the game reduces to a vector optimization problem for the
second player. We name these games, i.e. games where ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(J,Ω
k) is
a singleton for some player J ∈ {I, II}, degenerated and we exclude them
from our analysis. From here onward MOG∗0(m × n, r) denotes the class of
non-degenerated multiobjective zero-sum games.
In this section we have analyzed security strategies, and if we argue over
single-objective games we know that the pairs of security strategies are simul-
taneously equilibria of these games. For more than one objective, Pareto equi-
libria set and pairs of security strategies are not the same. It is possible to ap-
ply the method described in [1] to find the Pareto equilibria set for the game in
Example 6: PE(Ω) = ([0, 1/2]×{1})∪((1/2, 1]× [0, 1/2))∪((1/2, 1]×(3/4, 1])
(see figure 1). So x = (1, 0) and y = (1, 0) is an equilibrium of the game, but
it is not formed by a pair of security strategies.
yy
xx
11
11 00
1/21/2
1/21/2
3/43/4
XS × YS
PE(Ω)
Figure 1: Efficient strategies and Pareto Equilibria for Example 6
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4 Security equilibria
In a matrix game with only one objective, Nash equilibria are formed by pairs
of simultaneous security strategies. This may not be the same in multiobjec-
tive matrix game as shown above.
However a similar behaviour of the players might lead to an equilibrium,
that is to say, we look for equilibria formed by security strategies.
Definition 9 Let it be Ω ∈MOG∗0(m×n, r). A security equilibrium for Ω
is a pair (x∗,y∗) ∈ X × Y satisfying (x∗,y∗) ∈ PE(Ω), x∗ ∈ XS and y
∗ ∈ YS.
The set of security equilibria for Ω is represented by SE(Ω).
Let it be Ω ∈MOG∗0(m×n, r). A weak security equilibrium for Ω is a
pair (x∗,y∗) ∈ X × Y satisfying (x∗,y∗) ∈ WPE(Ω), x∗ ∈ XS and y
∗ ∈ YS.
The set of weak security equilibria for Ω is represented by WSE(Ω).
The following theorem shows that the set of weak security equilibria is
always non-empty.
Theorem 10 For any Ω ∈MOG∗0(m× n, r), WSE(Ω) 6= ∅.
Proof.
Let Ωk be one of the components of Ω and let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium
of Ωk. Notice that any Nash equilibrium of Ωk is a weak Pareto equilibrium
of Ω. To see this take the weighting vectors α = β = (0, . . . ,k) 1, . . . , 0) and
apply Theorem 1.
Moreover, from Proposition 2 we know O(I,Ωk)∩XS 6= ∅ and O(II,Ω
k)∩
YS 6= ∅. Combining both arguments we get WSE(Ω) 6= ∅.
In general, the lack of convexity of the setsXS and YS makes the analysis of
existence of security equilibria difficult. And in spite of the existence of weak
security equilibrium, it is not possible to guarantee the existence of security
equilibrium for a given game Ω ∈MOG∗0(m× n, r).
Nevertheless, in the 2×2 case, XS and YS are convex sets. This allows to
obtain some results for this kind of games. To this end, we classify the games
Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) into four categories. For three of them we show the
existence of security equilibria. For the remaining one we show that security
equilibrium might not exist.
Definition 11 A game Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is pure-solved if, for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, Ωk has a unique Nash equilibrium and it is in pure strategies
for each player.
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Definition 12 A game Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is determinated if it is not
pure-solved and, for some player J, it holds that ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(J,Ω
k) 6= ∅.
Any non-pure-solved and non-determinated game is named mixed-solved.
It is useful to introduce for any Ωk, k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, the parameter δk :=
ωk11+ω
k
22−ω
k
12−ω
k
21. In the special case of only two objectives, we can prove
the following useful property.
Lemma 13 For any mixed-solved biobjective game Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, 2) it
holds:
1. δ1 6= 0 and δ2 6= 0.
2. XS = [x
1, x2] = [(ω122 − ω
1
21)/δ
1, (ω222 − ω
2
21)/δ
2],
YS = [y
1, y2] = [(ω122 − ω
1
12)/δ
1, (ω222 − ω
2
12)/δ
2].
Proof.
See Appendix.
For more than two objectives we cannot guarantee that in a mixed-solved
game all δk are not zero, as we can see in the next example.
Example 14 Consider the game
Ω =
[(
2 1
2 1
)
,
(
0 2
1 0
)
,
(
0 −1
−2 0
)]
.
It is easy to see that O(I,Ω1) = [0, 1], O(I,Ω2) = {1/3}, O(I,Ω3) = {2/3},
O(II,Ω1) = {0}, O(II,Ω2) = {2/3}, O(II,Ω3) = {1/3}. Then the game is
mixed-solved, but δ1 = 0.
Definition 15 A mixed-solved game Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is positive if
there exists a mixed-solved subgame Ωkh = (Ωk,Ωh) ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, 2), for
h, k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, h 6= k, such that δk · δh > 0. Otherwise it is negative.
The game in Example 14 is negative since the biobjective subgames formed
by Ω1 and Ω2 or Ω1 and Ω3 are degenerated, and for the subgame formed by
Ω2 and Ω3 it holds δ2 · δ3 < 0.
In the case of biobjective mixed-solved games, by Lemma 13, δ1 6= 0 and
δ2 6= 0. If moreover the game is negative, then δ1 · δ2 < 0.
We have got a partition ofMOG∗0(2×2, r) into four non empty categories:
pure-solved, determinated, positive mixed-solved and negative mixed-solved.
We are going to prove that for any negative mixed-solved game with only two
objectives, Ω ∈MOG∗0(2× 2, 2), the security equilibria set is empty.
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Theorem 16 If Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, 2) is a negative mixed-solved game, then
SE(Ω) = ∅.
Proof.
See Appendix.
Nevertheless, as we can check in Example 14, for more than two objectives
the previous statement does not hold since the game is negative and SE(Ω) =
[1/3, 2/3]× [0, 1/3) 6= ∅.
Now we show that for the remaining classes of multiobjective 2×2 matrix
games the set of security equilibria is always non-empty regardless the number
of objectives.
Theorem 17 Let it be Ω ∈MOG∗0(2× 2, r).
1. If Ω is a pure-solved game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
2. If Ω is a determinated game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
3. If Ω is a positive mixed-solved game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
Proof.
See Appendix.
Combining Theorems 16 and 17 we can characterize the existence of secu-
rity equilibria in 2×2 matrix games with only two objectives.
Corollary 18 Let it be Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, 2). The set of security equilibria,
SE(Ω), is non-empty if and only if Ω is not a negative mixed-solved game.
Notice that we cannot completely characterize which multiobjective 2×2
matrix games have security equilibria. This is due to the fact that for negative
games we can only guarantee the non-existence of security equilibrium in the
biobjective case.
Finally, observe that the tools we have used are based on the convexity
properties of the sets of security strategies in the 2×2 case. Since these prop-
erties may fail in the general case, we leave the study of the m × n case to
subsequent works.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4: We analyze separately two cases:
1. Assume ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅. If x ∈ ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k), then aΩI ≤
x ≤ bΩI , for any k = 1, . . . , r. Therefore, a
Ω
I = maxk=1,...,ra
k
I ≤ b
Ω
I =
mink=1,...,rb
k
I and ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) = [aΩI , b
Ω
I ]. By Proposition 2 we get
the result.
2. Assume ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) = ∅. Notice that in this case bΩI < a
Ω
I and
then we only have to prove XS = [b
Ω
I , a
Ω
I ].
Since fk(x) = miny∈[0,1]xΩy
t = min{ωk21 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
21), ω
k
22 + x(ω
k
12 −
ωk22)}, then f
k(x) is a polygonal concave function, defined as a minimum
of two linear functions. Let us describe some properties that hold in this
case where ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) = ∅:
(a) If bkI 6= 0, then f
k(x) is increasing in [0, bkI ], for all k = 1, . . . , r.
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(b) If akI 6= 1, then f
k(x) is decreasing in [akI , 1], for all k = 1, . . . , r.
(c) If bΩI = b
k∗
I 6= 1, then f
k∗(x) is strictly decreasing in [bΩI , 1].
(d) If aΩI = a
k∗
I 6= 0, then f
k∗(x) is strictly increasing in [0, aΩI ].
(e) If bΩI 6= 0, then the functions f
k(x) are increasing in [0, bΩI ] for all
k = 1, . . . , r and at least one of them is strictly increasing.
By (a) all functions fk(x) are increasing in [0, bΩI ]. If none of them
were strictly increasing then all of them would be constant in [0, bΩI ]
and then ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅.
(f) If aΩI 6= 1, then the functions f
k(x) are decreasing in [aΩI , 1] for all
k = 1, . . . , r and at least one of them is strictly decreasing.
Let us prove that XS = [b
Ω
I , a
Ω
I ]. First notice that b
Ω
I 6= 1 and a
Ω
I 6= 0,
otherwise we would be in case 1.
Let x ∈ XS be any arbitrary element. If x /∈ [b
Ω
I , a
Ω
I ], then x ∈ [0, b
Ω
I ) or
x ∈ (aΩI , 1].
In the first case, x ∈ [0, bΩI ), by (e) we obtain f(x) ≤ f(b
Ω
I ) and f(x) 6=
f(bΩI ), which contradicts the fact x ∈ XS. Similarly if x ∈ (a
Ω
I , 1] but
now using (f). Therefore, XS ⊆ [b
Ω
I , a
Ω
I ].
Let us prove the other inclusion. Let x ∈ [bΩI , a
Ω
I ] be an arbitrary ele-
ment. Suppose x /∈ XS, this implies the existence of x
∗ ∈ [0, 1], x 6= x∗
such that f(x) ≤ f(x∗) and f(x) 6= f(x∗). If x ∈ (x∗, 1], by (c) we know
the existence of k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that fk
∗
(x) is strictly decreasing in
[bΩI , 1]. Therefore f
k∗(x∗) < fk
∗
(x), which contradicts f(x) ≤ f(x∗).
If x ∈ [0, x∗), by (d), there exists at least k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that
fk
∗
(x) is strictly increasing in [0, aΩI ], but then f
k∗(x∗) < fk
∗
(x), which
contradicts f(x) ≤ f(x∗).
Proof of Lemma 13:
1. Assume that δ1 = 0 (similarly for δ2 = 0), and so ω111+ ω
1
22 = ω
1
12+ω
1
21.
Without loss of generality suppose that ω111 ≥ ω
1
12, and then one of the
next three possibilities holds:
(a) If ω122 < ω
1
12, then ω
1
22 < ω
1
12 ≤ ω
1
11, from where either O(I,Ω
1) =
{1} andO(II,Ω1) = {0}, being Ω a pure-solved game, orO(II,Ω1) =
[0, 1], being Ω a determinated game, depending on whether ω111 >
ω112 or ω
1
11 = ω
1
12.
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(b) If ω122 > ω
1
12, since δ
1 = 0, then ω112 < ω
1
22 ≤ ω
1
21. Hence either
O(I,Ω1) = {0} and O(II,Ω1) = {0}, being Ω a pure-solved game,
or O(II,Ω1) = [0, 1], being Ω a determinated game, depending on
whether ω111 > ω
1
12 or ω
1
11 = ω
1
12.
(c) If ω122 = ω
1
12, since δ
1 = 0, then ω111 = ω
1
21 ≥ ω
1
22 = ω
1
12. Hence
O(I,Ω1) = [0, 1], and Ω is a determinated game.
2. By hypothesis neither Ω1 nor Ω2 have got a unique equlibrium in pure
strategies for I and II simultaneously. If player I has got mixed strate-
gies in O(I,Ω1), then either O(I,Ω1) = {x∗} or O(I,Ω1) = [0, x∗] or
O(I,Ω1) = [x∗, 1] for some x∗ ∈ (0, 1). Since f 1(x) is the minimum of
two linear functions it holds that ω121+(ω
1
11−ω
1
21)x
∗ = ω122+(ω
1
12−ω
1
22)x
∗,
and then x∗ = (ω122 − ω
1
21)/δ
1.
If there is only one optimal pure strategy, x∗ = 0 or x∗ = 1, for player I
in Ω1, then by hypothesis on the game Ω, player II has got an interval
of optimal strategies and this implies either ω121 = ω
1
22 for x
∗ = 0 or
ω112 = ω
1
11 for x
∗ = 1. In both cases x∗ = (ω122 − ω
1
21)/δ
1.
In any case, the interval O(I,Ω1) has got x∗ = (ω122 − ω
1
21)/δ
1 as an
extreme point. In a similar way, we can obtain (ω222−ω
2
21)/δ
2 as extreme
of O(I,Ω2).
Now, from Proposition 4 and taken into account that Ω is a mixed-solved
game, we get XS = [x
1, x2] = [(ω122 − ω
1
21)/δ
1, (ω222 − ω
2
21)/δ
2].
The second part of the statement is reached in a similar way.
Proof of Theorem 16: From Lemma 13 we know that YS = [y
1, y2] =
[(ω122 − ω
1
12)/δ
1, (ω222 − ω
2
12)/δ
2]. Notice that y1 6= y2, otherwise we are in the
degenerated case (see Corollary 8). Then, without loss of generality, y1 < y2.
As the game is negative mixed-solved, it holds δ1 · δ2 < 0. Let be δ1 > 0
and δ2 < 0 (the case δ1 < 0 and δ2 > 0 is similar).
Since y1 < y2, then 0 ≤ y1 < 1 which means 0 ≤ (ω122 − ω
1
12)/δ
1 <
1. Therefore, since δ1 > 0, ω111 > ω
1
21 and ω
1
22 ≥ ω
1
12 . And moreover we
claim ω111 > ω
1
12. Suppose not (i.e. ω
1
22 ≥ ω
1
12 ≥ ω
1
11 > ω
1
21), in this case
O(I,Ω1) = {1} and either O(II,Ω1) = {1} if ω112 > ω
1
11 or O(II,Ω
1) = [0, 1]
if ω122 = ω
1
12 = ω
1
11 or O(II,Ω
1) = [y1, 1] if ω122 > ω
1
12 = ω
1
11. In the first case
the game is pure-solved; in the other two cases, since O(II,Ω1) = [0, 1], or
O(II,Ω1) = [y1, 1] and y2 ∈ [y1, 1] by hypothesis, the game is determinated,
and in both cases we get a contradiction.
Summarizing, for δ1 > 0 we have got
ω111 > ω
1
21, ω
1
22 ≥ ω
1
12, ω
1
11 > ω
1
12. (2)
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By a similar reasoning, as δ2 < 0,
ω212 > ω
2
22, ω
2
21 ≥ ω
2
11, ω
2
12 > ω
2
11. (3)
Given y∗ ∈ Y , we know that PI(y
∗) = {xΩy∗t | x ∈ X} = conv{z1, z2}, being:
z1 = (1, 0)Ωy
∗t = (ω112 + y
∗(ω111 − ω
1
12), ω
2
12 + y
∗(ω211 − ω
2
12)),
z2 = (0, 1)Ωy
∗t = (ω122 + y
∗(ω121 − ω
1
22), ω
2
22 + y
∗(ω221 − ω
2
22)). (4)
For y∗ = y1 it holds ω112+y
1(ω111−ω
1
12) = ω
1
22+y
1(ω121−ω
1
22). Therefore player
I can play any strategy x ∈ [0, 1] to obtain the highest possible payoff in the
first objective.
If y∗ ∈ (y1, 1] it holds ω112 + y
∗(ω111 − ω
1
12) > ω
1
22 + y
∗(ω121 − ω
1
22) since for
y∗ = 1 we have ω111 > ω
1
21. Therefore player I obtains the highest payoff in the
first objective by playing x = 1 if y∗ ∈ (y1, 1].
Similarly, the highest payoff in the second objective for player I is x = 1 if
y∗ ∈ [0, y2) and x ∈ [0, 1] if y∗ = y2.
Combining the previous reasoning we have BRSI(y
∗) = {1} for y∗ ∈
[y1, y2].
Therefore, if SE(Ω) 6= ∅, then x = 1 ∈ XS = [x
1, x2]. If x1 = (ω122 −
ω121)/δ
1 = 1 then ω111 = ω
1
12 getting a contradiction with (2). If x
2 = 1 we
have a contradiction with (3). As a consequence SE(Ω) = ∅.
Proof of Theorem 17:
1. If Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is a pure-solved game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
Without loss of generality let x1 = 1 and y1 = 1 be the unique equilibrium in
the scalar game Ω1. As a consequence we have: ω112 ≥ ω
1
11 ≥ ω
1
21.
We claim that the above inequalities are strict: ω112 > ω
1
11 > ω
1
21.
Notice that ω112 = ω
1
11 = ω
1
21 implies either O(I,Ω
1) = [0, 1] or O(II,Ω1) =
[0, 1] or both, which contradicts that Ω is a pure solved game.
Assume ω112 = ω
1
11 > ω
1
21. As by hypothesis y
1 = 1 is the unique solution
for player II in Ω1 we know that y1 = 1 has to be the unique solution of the
program Miny∈[0,1]max{(0, 1)Ω
1(y, 1 − y)t, (1, 0)Ω1(y, 1 − y)t}, that is to say
Miny∈[0,1]max{ω
1
22 + y(ω
1
21 − ω
1
22), ω
1
12}.
If ω122 ≤ ω
1
12, then ω
1
22+ y(ω
1
21−ω
1
22) ≤ ω
1
12 for all y ∈ [0, 1], since for y = 0
ω122 ≤ ω
1
12 and for y = 1 ω
1
21 < ω
1
12. Therefore the above program becomes
Miny∈[0,1]{ω
1
12}, and [0,1] is the set of solutions. This implies a contradiction
with the fact that y1 = 1 is the unique solution.
If ω122 > ω
1
12, the above two linear functions involved in the minimization
program intersect, since for y = 0 ω122 > ω
1
12 and for y = 1 ω
1
21 < ω
1
12. The
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intersection point y∗ = (ω112 − ω
1
22)/(ω
1
21 − ω
1
22) is in (0,1). As a consequence,
O(II,Ω1) = [y∗, 1] giving a contradiction with the fact of y∗ is the unique
solution.
The remaining case can be analyze in the same way.
Once proved ω112 > ω
1
11 > ω
1
21, notice that x
1 = 1 is the best reply strategy
to y∗ = 1 for player I since ω111 > ω
1
21. And since ω
1
11 < ω
1
12, y
1 = 1 is the best
reply strategy to x∗ = 1.
Therefore the unique pure equilibrium of Ω1, (x1, y1) = (1, 1), is a Pareto
equilibrium of the game Ω.
Finally, by Proposition 2, x1 = 1 ∈ XS and y
1 = 1 ∈ YS. As a consequence
(x1, y1) = (1, 1) ∈ SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
2. If Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is a determinated game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
Assume first ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅ and ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(II,Ω
k) 6= ∅. By Propo-
sition 2 it holds that XS = ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) and YS = ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(II,Ω
k).
Let it be x∗ ∈ XS and y
∗ ∈ YS. Taken any α, β ∈
o
∆r, by Theorem 1, we
obtain (x∗, y∗) ∈ PE(Ω). Therefore (x∗, y∗) ∈ SE(Ω).
Assume now ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅ and ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(II,Ω
k) = ∅ (similarly
for the other case).
By Corollary 8, the set ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) is not a singleton. Then each
O(I,Ωk) has got at least two elements.
The sets O(I,Ωk) are the solutions of the program
max
x∈[0,1]
min{ωk21 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
21), ω
k
22 + x(ω
k
12 − ω
k
22)}. (5)
If O(I,Ωk) is not a singleton, then at least one of the two linear functions
involves in (5), l1(x) = ω
k
21 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
21) and l2(x) = ω
k
22 + x(ω
k
12 − ω
k
22), has
to be flat, i.e. ωk11 = ω
k
21 or ω
k
12 = ω
k
22, for any k = 1, 2, . . . , r.
If ωk11 = ω
k
21 (similarly for the other case), then one of the next three cases
may accur:
(A) ωk22 > ω
k
21 = ω
k
11
(B) ωk12 > ω
k
21 = ω
k
11
(C) ωk12 = ω
k
22 ≤ ω
k
21 = ω
k
11.
To see it, notice that if ωk11 = ω
k
21 and the other two entries of the matrix Ω
k
are both above the value ωk11 = ω
k
21, then both entries have to coincide. In
other words, if ωk11 = ω
k
21 ≥ ω
k
12, ω
k
22, then l1(x) ≥ l2(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1],
and the program (5) has a unique solution if ωk12 6= ω
k
22, which involves a
contradiction with the fact that O(I,Ωk) is not a singleton.
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For the other case, ωk12 = ω
k
22, by a a similar argument we obtain three
possible cases:
(D) ωk21 > ω
k
22 = ω
k
12
(E) ωk11 > ω
k
22 = ω
k
12
(F) ωk11 = ω
k
21 ≤ ω
k
22 = ω
k
12.
Since the set O(II,Ωk) is the solution of the program
min
y∈[0,1]
max{ωk12 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
12), ω
k
22 + x(ω
k
21 − ω
k
22)}.
It is easy to prove in cases (A) or (B), O(II,Ωk) = {1}, in cases (D) or
(E), O(II,Ωk) = {0} and in cases (C) or (F) O(II,Ωk) = [0, 1].
Since ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(II,Ω
k) = ∅ we deduce the existence of at least k 6= h ∈
{1, . . . , r} such that Ωk satisfies (A) or (B) and Ωh satisfies (D) or (E). So, by
Proposition 2, we have YS = [0, 1].
Now, we are going to study the following four cases:
1. If XS = [0, 1], since YS = [0, 1], by Theorem 1, SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
2. If XS = [0, b], being 0 < b < 1.
By Proposition 2 item 1 we have that for every scalar game Ωk, k ∈
{1, . . . , r}, O(I,Ωk) = [0, bk], b ≤ bk ≤ 1. Moreover, asXS = ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) =
[0, b] there exists a scalar game Ωk, k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, satisfying O(I,Ωk) =
[0, b]. As a consequence Ωk satisfies conditions (A) or (D). Let us asume
that Ωk satisfies (A) (the case Ωk satisfying (D) can be argued similarly).
As O(I,Ωk) = [0, b] being 0 < b < 1 then condition (A) for Ωk will be
satisfied in the following strong form,
ωk22 > ω
k
21 = ω
k
11 > ω
k
12. (6)
The value b can be achieved by solving (5). Since ωk22 > ω
k
21 = ω
k
11 > ω
k
12
then the parameter b will be the strategy where ωk21 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
21) =
ωk22 + x(ω
k
12 − ω
k
22), or
b = (ωk22 − ω
k
21)/δ
k. (7)
The payoff for player I in the game Ωk is:
P kI (y∗) = conv{(1, 0)Ω
k
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
, (0, 1)Ωk
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
}
= conv{ωk12 + y
∗(ωk11 − ω
k
12), ω
k
22 + y
∗(ωk21 − ω
k
22)}.
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Player I obtains his highest payoff in objective k playing x = 0 if y∗ ∈
[0, 1) and any x ∈ [0, 1] when y∗ = 1. Therefore for any y∗ ∈ [0, 1)
x∗ = 0 ∈ BRSI(y
∗). (8)
On the other hand, as ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(II,Ω
k) = ∅ and Ωk satisfies (6) which
implies {1} = O(II,Ωk), it must exist a second scalar game Ωh, h 6=
k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, satisfying condition (D) or (E).
If Ωh satisfies (D), ωh21 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12, then the payoff for player II in the
objective h when player I plays x∗ = 0 is
P hII(x
∗ = 0) = conv{(0, 1)Ωh
(
1
0
)
, (0, 1)Ωh
(
0
1
)
} = conv{ωh21, ω
h
22}.
Since ωh21 > ω
h
22 and player II is a minimizer we obtain
y∗ = 0 ∈ BRSII(x∗ = 0). (9)
By (8) and (9) we obtain (0, 0) ∈ PE(Ω) and (0, 0) ∈ XS × YS =
[0, b]× [0, 1], or equivalently (0, 0) ∈ SE(Ω).
If Ωh satisfies (E), ωh11 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12, then ω
h
21 ≥ ω
h
22 = ω
h
12 since if
ωh22 = ω
h
12 > ω
h
21 then we should have ω
h
11 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12 > ω
h
21 which
implies O(I,Ωh) = [d, 1] with 0 < d < 1 getting a contradiction with
the fact that O(I,Ωk) = [0, bk], 0 < b ≤ bk ≤ 1, for any k = 1, . . . , r.
Therefore if ωh21 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12 we are in case (D) for the game Ω
h and the
proof is finished. Only rest to analyze the case where Ωh satisfies
ωh11 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12 = ω
h
21. (10)
The payoff for player I in the objective Ωh is given by:
P hI (y
∗) = conv{(1, 0)Ωh
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
, (0, 1)Ωh
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
}
= conv{ωh12 + y
∗(ωh11 − ω
h
12), ω
h
22 + y
∗(ωh21 − ω
h
22)}.
Player I obtains his highest payoff in objective h playing x = 1 when
y∗ ∈ (0, 1] and any x ∈ [0, 1] when y∗ = 0.
By (8) and the above reasoning we obtain [0, 1] = BRSI(y
∗) when y∗ ∈
(0, 1).
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For player II we have:
P kII(x
∗) = conv{(x∗, 1− x∗)Ωk
(
1
0
)
, (x∗, 1− x∗)Ωk
(
0
1
)
}
= conv{ωk21 + x
∗(ωk11 − ω
k
21), ω
k
22 + x
∗(ωk12 − ω
k
22)}
and
P hII(x
∗) = conv{(x∗, 1− x∗)Ωh
(
1
0
)
, (x∗, 1− x∗)Ωh
(
0
1
)
}
= conv{ωh21 + x
∗(ωh11 − ω
h
21), ω
h
22 + x
∗(ωh12 − ω
h
22)}.
In the objective k, for x∗ ∈ (0, b) player II (the minimizer) obtains the
lowest payoff playing y = 1 since for x∗ = 0, ωk22 > ω
k
21 and for x
∗ = b,
it holds ωk21 + x
∗(ωk11 − ω
k
21) = ω
k
22 + x
∗(ωk12 − ω
k
22) (see (6) and (7)).
In the objective h, for x∗ ∈ (0, 1] player II obtains the lowest payoff
playing y = 0 since for x∗ = 0, ωh22 = ω
h
21 and for x
∗ = 1 it holds
ωh11 > ω
h
12 (see (10)).
We have obtained [0, 1] = BRSII(x
∗) for any x∗ ∈ (0, b).
Finally, notice that any (x∗, y∗) ∈ (0, b) × (0, 1) ⊆ XS × YS will satisfy
(x∗, y∗) ∈ SE(Ω). As a consequence SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
3. If XS = [a, 1], being 0 < a < 1. SE(Ω) 6= ∅ similarly to part 2.
4. If XS = [a, b], being 0 < a < b < 1.
By Proposition 4 and from ∩k∈{1,...,r}O(I,Ω
k) 6= ∅ there exist scalar
games Ωk and Ωh, k 6= h ∈ {1, . . . , r} satisfying O(I,Ωk) = [0, b] and
O(I,Ωh) = [a, 1]. As a consequence the game Ωk has to satisfy one of
the following conditions:
(a) ωk22 > ω
k
21 = ω
k
11 > ω
k
12 (b) ω
k
21 > ω
k
22 = ω
k
12 > ω
k
11
and the game Ωh one of the following,
(c) ωh11 > ω
h
22 = ω
h
12 > ω
h
21 (d) ω
h
12 > ω
h
21 = ω
h
11 > ω
h
22.
We can obtain the value b from (5), being b the strategy x such that
ωk21 + x(ω
k
11 − ω
k
21) = ω
k
22 + x(ω
k
12 − ω
k
22). It is to say b = (ω
k
22 − ω
k
21)/δ
k.
Similarly a = (ωh22 − ω
h
21)/δ
h.
Suposse that Ωk satisfies (a)(the case Ωk satisfying (b) can be argued
similarly). We have to analyze two cases:
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When Ωk satisfies (a) and Ωh satisfies (c).
In part 2 above we have seen that for the game Ωk satisfying (a) player
I obtains his highest payoff in the objective k playing x = 0 when y∗ ∈
[0, 1) and any x ∈ [0, 1] when y∗ = 1.
Similarly, when Ωh satisfies (c) I obtains his highest payoff in the objec-
tive h playing any x ∈ [0, 1] when y∗ = 0 since
P hI (y
∗ = 0) = conv{(1, 0)Ωh
(
0
1
)
, (0, 1)Ωh
(
0
1
)
} = conv(ωh12, ω
h
22)
and it holds ωh12 = ω
h
22 and x = 1 when y
∗ ∈ [0, 1) since
P hI (y
∗ = 1) = conv{(1, 0)Ωh
(
1
0
)
, (0, 1)Ωh
(
1
0
)
} = conv(ωh11, ω
h
21)
and it holds ωh11 > ω
h
21.
We have deduced BRSkhI (y
∗) = [0, 1] for any y∗ ∈ (0, 1) which implies
for any y∗ ∈ (0, 1)
BRSI(y
∗) = [0, 1]. (11)
The payoff for player II in the scalar game Ωk is
P kII(x
∗) = conv{(x∗, 1− x∗)Ωk
(
1
0
)
, (x∗, 1− x∗)Ωk
(
0
1
)
}
= conv{ωk21 + y
∗(ωk11 − ω
k
21), ω
k
22 + y
∗(ωk12 − ω
k
22)}
being for x∗ = b the equality
ωk21 + x
∗(ωk11 − ω
k
21) = ω
k
22 + x
∗(ωk12 − ω
k
22).
Then, for x∗ = b, player II obtains his lowest payoff in objective h playing
any strategy y ∈ [0, 1]. The lowest payoff when player I plays x∗ ∈ [0, b)
is obtained when player II plays y = 1 since ωk21 < ω
k
22 and the lowest
payoff when player I plays x∗ ∈ (b, 1] is obtaining when player II plays
y = 0 since ωk12 < ω
k
11.
In the objective h, for x∗ = a player II obtains his lowest payoff in
objective k playing any strategy y ∈ [0, 1]. The lowest payoff when
player I plays x∗ ∈ [0, a) is obtained when player II plays y = 1 since
ωh21 < ω
h
22 and the lowest payoff when player I plays x
∗ ∈ (a, 1] is obtained
when player II plays y = 0 since ωh12 < ω
h
11.
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We deduce BRSkhII (x
∗) = BRSII(x
∗) = [0, 1] for x∗ ∈ (a, b). As a
consequence (see also (11) (a, b)× (0, 1) ⊆ SE(Ω) and then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
When Ωk satisfies (a) and Ωh satisfies (d).
When Ωh satisfies (d) player I (the maximizer) obtains his highest payoff
in the objective h playing x = 1 when y∗ ∈ [0, 1) and any x ∈ [0, 1] when
y∗ = 1, since
P hI (y
∗) = conv{(1, 0)Ωh
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
, (0, 1)Ωh
(
y∗
1− y∗
)
}
= conv{ωh12 + y
∗(ωh11 − ω
h
12), ω
h
22 + y
∗(ωh21 − ω
h
22)}.
Therefore BRSkhI (y
∗) = BRSI(y
∗) = [0, 1] for y∗ ∈ [0, 1).
To calculate the best replay strategies set for player II we need to con-
sider that if the scalar games Ωk and Ωh with k 6= h ∈ {1, . . . , r}, satisfy
conditions (a) and (d) then O(II,Ωk) ∩O(II,Ωh) = {1}. Since that, it
must exist a third game Ωj, j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, j 6= kand j 6= h, such that
Ωj satisfies (D) or (E) and in this way we get O(II,Ωj) = {0}.
Let us assume first that Ωj satisfies (D). Then O(I,Ωj) = [0, bk] with
b ≤ bk ≤ 1 as we have seen in part 2 above.
We are going to use the scalar games Ωk and Ωj to deduce BRSII(x
∗).
The payoff for player II in the scalar game Ωj is
P jII(x
∗) = conv{(x∗, 1− x∗)Ωj
(
1
0
)
, (x∗, 1− x∗)Ωj
(
0
1
)
}
= conv{ωj21 + x
∗(ωj11 − ω
j
21), ω
j
22 + x
∗(ωj12 − ω
j
22)}.
Doing as before, we see that the lowest payoff in the objective j for
player II when player I plays x∗ ∈ [0, bk) it is obtained when player II
plays y = 0, since ωj21 > ω
j
22.
Let us assume now that Ωj satisfies (E). Then O(I,Ωj) = [ak, 1] with
0 ≤ ak ≤ a. And doing as before we reach that the lowest payoff in the
objective j for player II when player I plays x∗ ∈ (ak, 1] it is obtained
when player II plays y = 0, since ωj11 > ω
j
12.
Considering the objectives k and j, we reach in both cases BRSkjII (x
∗) =
BRSII(x
∗) = [0, 1] for x∗ ∈ [a, b). As a consequence we get (a, b) ×
(0, 1) ⊆ SE(Ω) which implies SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
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3. If Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is a positive game, then SE(Ω) 6= ∅. As
Ω ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, r) is a positive mixed-solved game there exists a mixed-
solved subgame Ωkh = (Ωk,Ωh) ∈ MOG∗0(2 × 2, 2), with k 6= h ∈ {1, . . . , r},
satisfying δk · δh > 0. Let us assume without loss of generality k=1 and h=2
in order to use the same arguments as in Theorem 16.
From Lemma 13 we know that YS = [y
1, y2] = [(ω122 − ω
1
12)/δ
1, (ω222 −
ω212)/δ
2]. Notice that y1 = y2 violates the non-degeneration hypothesis (see
Corollary 8), and so we can assume y1 < y2.
As δ1 · δ2 > 0 let us analyze the case δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0 (the case δ1 < 0
and δ2 < 0 is similar).
Following the reasoning in the proof of Theorem 16, we know ω111 > ω
1
21,
ω122 ≥ ω
1
12 and ω
1
11 > ω
1
12.
Since y1 < y2 then 0 < y2 ≤ 1 which means 0 < (ω222 − ω
2
12)/δ
2 ≤ 1.
Therefore ω211 ≥ ω
2
21 and ω
2
22 > ω
2
12 since δ
2 > 0. We claim that ω211 > ω
2
12. If
not (i.e. ω222 > ω
2
12 ≥ ω
2
11 ≥ ω
2
21) O(II,Ω
2) = {1} and either O(I,Ω2) = {1} if
ω211 > ω
2
21 or O(I,Ω
2) = [0, 1] if ω211 = ω
2
21. In the first case Ω
12 is a pure-solved
game or determinated in the second, and both cases are out of our analisys.
Summarizing: ω211 ≥ ω
2
21, ω
2
22 > ω
2
12 and ω
2
11 > ω
2
12.
From Theorem 16 we know that player I obtains the highest payoff in the
first objective by playing x = 1 if y∗ ∈ (y1, 1].
Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 16, see (4), for y∗ = y2 it holds
ω212 + y
2(ω211 − ω
2
12) = ω
2
22 + y
2(ω221 − ω
2
22). Therefore player I can play any
strategy x ∈ [0, 1] to obtain the highest payoff in the second objective.
If y∗ ∈ [0, y2) it holds ω212 + y
∗(ω211 − ω
2
12) < ω
2
22 + y
∗(ω221 − ω
2
22) since for
y∗ = 0 we have ω212 < ω
2
22. Therefore player I obtains the highest payoff in the
second objective by playing x = 0.
From there we deduce that BRS12I (y
∗) = [0, 1] for y∗ ∈ (y1, y2). Similarly
for player II we deduce that BRS12II (x
∗) = [0, 1] for x∗ ∈ (x1, x2), where
XS = [x
1, x2].
Assume now that x∗ ∈ (x1, x2), y∗ ∈ (y1, y2) and x∗ /∈ BRSI(y
∗). Then
there exists x+ ∈ X and x+ 6= x∗ such that x+Ωy∗t > x∗Ωy∗t. As x∗ ∈
BRS12I (y
∗) this implies that x+Ω1y∗t = x∗Ω1y∗t and x+Ω2y∗t = x∗Ω2y∗t.
Working with these last expressions, since x+ 6= x∗ we reach δ1y∗+ω112−ω
1
22 = 0
and δ2y∗ + ω212 − ω
2
22 = 0 from where, by Lemma 13, y
∗ = y1 = y2 getting a
contradiction with the fact that Ω12 is not a determinated game.
A similar argument produces y∗ ∈ BRSII(x
∗). From x∗ ∈ BRSI(y
∗) and
y∗ ∈ BRSII(x
∗) we reach (x1, x2)× (y1, y2) ⊆ PE(Ω) and then SE(Ω) 6= ∅.
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